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CASE COMMENTS
of the decree is to unduly restrict the people of Floyd County in their
free choice of hospitalization.1 0
E. R. WEBB
CONTRACTS-IS A NEW AMORTIZATION PLAN FOR PAY-
MENT OF A MORTGAGE CONTRACT A NOVATION
IN KENTUCKY?
A stockholder in an insolvent national farm loan association sought
payment of the face value of his stock. A mortgage contract between
the stockholder and the association had been made in 1926 as a colidi-
tion precedent to a loan granted by the Federal Land Bank of Louis-
ville.' Subsequent to amendment of the Farm Loan Act in 1933 a new
agreement had been made which stipulated that the unpaid amount of
indebtedness should be repaid on an amortization plan. Plaintiff con-
tended, inter alia, that by reason of the "new contract" his liability as
a stockholder should be determined by the provisions of the amend-
ment. The court denied recovery, holding that the amendment relied
on applied only to contracts, debts or engagements of the association
entered into after 1933. The court further stated that the new agree-
compete with the promissee in that county. Kochenrath v. Christman,
180 Ky. 799, 203 S. W. 738 (1918) is not in point, for there the promisor
set up a business in the forbidden territory and could not have violated
the provisions of the contract more flagrantly. Gutzeit v. Strader, 158
Ky. 131, 164 S. W. 318 (1918) is not in point, for in that case the promi-
sor had operated a business in the forbidden territory by means of a
dummy corporation. This amounted to a violation of the express terms
of the contract. Foxworth-Galbraith Lumber Co. v. Turner, 121 Tex.
177, 46 S. W. (2d) 663 (1932) is distinguishable. There the promisor
did considerable solicitation in the territory in which he had agreed
not to compete, which might amount to doing business there according
to the dictum of Midland Lumber Co. v. Roessler, 203 Wis. 129, 233
N. W. 614, 616 (1930).
(1939) 38 Mich. Law Rev. 242, 244.
One desiring to borrow money from a Federal Land Bank must
become a shareholder in the Farm Loan Association; as such a share-
holder, prior to 1933, he was individually responsible, not only for the
amount represented by his shares, but in addition thereto to the extent
of the amount of stock owned by him at its par value. See Byrne v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 61 N. D. 265, 237 N. W. 797 (1931).
However, in 1933 the Farm Loan Act was amended to read: ". . . the
shareholders of national farm loan associations shall not be held indi-
vidually responsible for any contract, debt, or engagement of such
association entered into after June 16, 1933". (Italics added.)
12 U. S. C. A. sec. 744a. Thus if, and only if, the new agreement dis-
charged and took the place of the existing loan contract it was a "con-
tract, debt, or engagement of such association entered into after
June 16, 1933". The purpose of the amendment is not entirely clear.
If it contemplated a different degree of liability for all who became
stockholders after 1933, then the court's concern as to a novation, or
new contract, was unnecessary. If it is to be construed literally to
apply to contracts made after 1933, it must be decided whether the new
agreement novated the old.
K. L. J.-8
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ment did not constitute a novation or otherwise affect the stockholder's
original liability. Bracken-Robertson National Farm Loan Association
et al. v. Downing et al., 281 Ky. 167, 135 S. W. (2d) 421 (1939).
Etymologically novation is from novare, meaning to "make new".
Logically it may denote the substitution of a third person for one of the
two parties to a relationship, or it can just as accurately indicate the
substitution of a new relation between the same parties. At common
law the term is usually applied only to a situation where the sub-
stituted contract has a new party,' while the civil law usage Is not so
limited. Thus in Louisiana a substituted contract between the same
parties is a novation.3 However, in a number of common- law jurisdic-
tions both the civil law and common law definitions have been used.
One of these is Kentucky.
4
As would be expected, such an interchanging of terminology has
led to a certain degree of confusion. Various elements have been
emphasized in pointing out what constitutes a novation in Kentucky.
The substitution of a new debtor or creditor,5 an intention to replace an
existing obligation,* and the finding of a new consideration' have all
been used as essential factors. In at least one instance there has been
an attempt to generalize by setting out certain requisites for the new
contract. The case of Daviess County Bank and Trust Co. v. Wright,
says:
a novation is the making of a new contract, its
elements being the same as in the first contract, which are parties,
a meeting of the minds and a consideration."s
But the same observations might be made of any contract.
If a criterion is desired which can be applied to all cases, and more
particularly to the instant case, it must result from a compilation of
illustrative decisions. There is little doubt that there must be a prior
contract which is discharged by a new obligation supported by new con-
sideration. These essentials being characteristic of all cases, the
narrow question remains in each individual case whether it is neces-
sary that a new party be substituted in the new contract. Until 'Watts'
Admr. v. Smith,' it seemed well settled in Kentucky that a novation
occurred only when the new contract involved a third person.1 In this
2VI Williston, Contracts (Revised ed., 1938) See. 1865.
3 Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Endom et al., 51 La. Ann. 1263, 26
So. 90, 91 (1899).4 Watts' Admr. v. Smith, 250 Ky. 617, 63 8. W. (2d) 796 (1923).
5 Kushner v. Knopf, 227 Ky. 369, 13 S. W. (2d) 271 (1929).
OTruscon Steel Co. v. Thirlwell Electric Co., 265 Ky. 414, 416-417,
96 S. W. (2d) 1023, 1025 (1936).
7 Daviess County Bank and Trust Co. v. Wright, 129 Ky. 21, 110
S. W. 361 (1908).
8 Ibid
9250 Ky. 617, 620, 63 S. W. (2d) 796 (1933).
10 See Kentucky Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts (1938)
Sec. 424, clause (c) which cites: Hart v. Trustees of Princeton College,
10 Ky. Op. 233 (1880); Larimore v. West, 227 Ky. 306, 12 S. W. (2d)
856 (1928); Kushner v. Knopf, 227 Ky. 369, 13 S. W. (2d) 271 (1929).
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case a mortgage note was never released of record, but a new note and
mortgage was executed between the same parties. The court held
squarely that there was a novation saying:
"The parties are agreed that a 'novation' is a contract between
the parties whereby, for a valuable consideration, a creditor agrees
to cancel an old obligation and to substitute in its place a new one.
To this we may add that it is not essential that the assent
to *the terms of the novation be shown by express words to that
effect, but the same may be implied from the circumstances
attending the transaction.... "I
In the instant case the court apparently felt that an adjudication
of plaintiff's rights Involved the question of novation, and yet no
attempt was made to distinguish or discuss the effect of the Watts case.
There are two possible explanations of the position taken in the prin-
cipal case: (1) Either the court confused novation with the settled
rule that a mortgage is not discharged or lien affected by a change in
form of the debt secured, or in the form of evidence of it; or (2) the
Watts case was considered unimportant because, in the opinion of the
court, the substitution of a long time amortization plan of payment did
not amount to a new contract.
Support for the first explanation is found in the fact that the prin-
cipal case cited only one case, that of Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v.
Louisville Ry. Co., which said:
"It is well settled that a mortgage is not discharged or its lien
affected by any change in the form of the debt which it secures,
or in the form of the evidence of it, so long as a novation is not
executed. "2
The limitation placed on this holding by the phrase "so long as a nova-
tion is not executed" indicates that the Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.
case is only authority for the proposition that a mortgage is not dis-
charged. But the instant case does not involve that precise point.
It Is concerned rather with the rights accruing under a new agreement
which alters the manner of paying an existing debt.
The second alternative explanation places the principal case in a
more tenable position. Kentucky is without authority on the particular
type of change which the existing debt underwent here, that of
amortization. However, in the somewhat analogous instance of renew-
ing a note, the existing obligation is usually not novated. Similarly
where a new instrument was executed which recited "due $100.00 bal-
ance on mortgage" there was no novation, for the purpose of the
2250 Ky. 617, 620, 63 S. W. (2d) 796, 798 (1933).
" 234 Ky. 802, 809, 29 S. W. (2d) 552, 555 (1930).
1 McGowan v. Peoples Bank, 185 Ky. 20, 213 S. W. 579 (1919).
Accord: Brudett v. Clay, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 287 (1848); Sten v. Gro-
tenkeper, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 888, 12 Ky. Opin. 39 (1883); Jarboe v. Shively,
109 Ky. 402, 59 S. W. 328 (1900).
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instrument was merely to show the balance due.1 On the other hand,
Richard v. Davis' Assignee holds that:
"While a mere renewal of a note is not a satisfaction of it, yet
if, in the absence of fraud or mistake, the creditor obtains an
additional advantage of legal value, and the new rights and inter-
ests intervene, this fact, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, operates as a novation and extinguishes the first debt." 15
In the absence of more than, analogous authority the actual change
which took place in the existing debt in the principal case should be
pointed out. The original plan of payment is not given, but the plan
of amortization in the subsequent agreement was a new one provided
for by the amended act, calling for seventy-one semi-annual install-
ments September 1, 1935, and ending March 1, 1971. Even though it be
admitted that the interest on such an obligation is not a part of the
debt, it can be forcibly argued that one who gives up the use of his
money for such a long period has suffered a detriment. Likewise, the
one who receives its use obtains a benefit. As the court correctly points
out: "the original obligations stood unaffected by the agreement
except that more liberal terms with respect to amortization payments
were granted the borrower .... ," but it is conceivable that the
exception overshadows the general statement. The fundamental upon
which the practice of amortization payments rests is the economic con-
cept of time utility as applied to money. It is increasingly diffcult, in
a time of fluctuating monetary standards, to divorce the monetary unit
from that which it represents, the debt. Aside from its metallic con-
tent, money has no value except in relation to its use at a particular
time, and unless the obligation in the instant case has the same value
in 1971 that it had in 1933, it has in fact been changed.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that (1) the term
novation as used in Kentucky is not limited to a situation where the
existing obligor or obligee is replaced by a third party, but is equally
applicable when there is a substitution of a new agreement between
the same parties; and (2) that a new agreement setting out a more
liberal amortization plan for payment of an existing debt, in the
absence of authority, should in fact change the entire obligation and
create a new debt.
Although the decision of the instant case can rest on other grounds,
it is submitted that the court failed to take advantage of an oppor-
tunity to clarity the Kentucky law in regard to novations, and might
well have reached a contrary result without a strained interpretation
of the new agreement pleaded by plaintiff.
W. L. MATTHOWS, JR.
14Russell v. Centers, 153 Ky. 1469, 155 S. W. 1149 (1912).
'57 Ky. Law Rep. 358 (1885).
"Bracken Robertson National Farm Loan v. Downing, 281 Ky.
167, 135 S. W. (2d) 421, 426 (1939).
